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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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Plaintiff/Appellant/ : Cert. No. 900086 
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: Priority No. 13 
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REPLY OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT/PETITIONER 
TO RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
Pursuant to Rule 50(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
Plaintiff/Appellant/Petitioner, Barbara J. Motes, submits the following Reply Brief to the 
Defendant/Cross Appellant/Respondent's response to the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
Since Major Motes' Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts makes references to 
that portion of the trial court's decision relative to the Petitioner's inheritance and the manner 
in which the Court of Appeals addressed that issue, the Petitioner has included in the Addendum 
to this Reply Brief, a complete copy of Point I of her Petition for Rehearing related to how her 
inheritance was handled by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals so that this Court can 
be informed of the facts and disposition of that issue and its relationship to the issues presently 
before this Court. (See also paragraphs 8, 9 & 14 of Findings of Fact and paragraphs 26, 36 
& 37 of the Conclusions of Law — Addendum to Major Motes' Response.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE PANEL OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN 
Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) Petition for Rehearing 
denied (Jan. 29, 1990), IS IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH OTHER 
DECISIONS OF THE PANELS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN Fulmer 
v. Fulmer. 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988) AND Martinez v. Martinez. 754 
P.2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) cert, granted 765 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1988), AS 
THOSE DOCUMENTS PERTAIN TO THE TREATMENT OF THE 
FEDERAL INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS IN UTAH DIVORCE CASES 
Major Motes attempts to argue in Point I of his Response that the decision of the Court 
of Appeals in Motes v. Motes. 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989) Petition for Rehearing denied 
(Jan. 29, 1990)brings clarity to the law in Utah as it relates to the trial court's authority to 
allocate income tax exemptions in divorce proceedings. Nothing could be more incorrect. 
In Martinez v. Martinez. 754 P.2d 1277 (Utah App. 1988) cert, granted 765 P.2d 1272 
(Utah 1988), the Utah Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in allocating the tax 
exemptions between the husband and the wife and stated: 
Plaintiff is entitled to the tax exemptions for all of the children in view of the 
award of custody to her and the failure of defendant to establish any exception 
to the general rule stated above. Id. at 72 (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly, Martinez stands for the proposition that in Utah, the custodial parent is entitled 
to claim the exemptions for Federal and State income tax purposes unless one of the specific 
exceptions contained in the Internal Revenue Code exists. In Motes no such exception was 
present. 
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Martinez, supra was decided in April of 1988 and in September of 1988, the Court of 
Appeals once again reaffirmed general rule of Martinez in Fulmer v. Fulmer. 761 P.2d 942 
(Utah App. 1988) when Judge Billings, writing for herself and Judges Garff and Greenwood 
stated: 
. . . We agree with the Courts that have concluded they do not have the authority 
to grant the exemption contrary to the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Id. at 950 
The Motes decision did not overrule either Martinez or Fulmer. However, but went on 
held that trial courts in Utah now have the discretion to allocate exemptions and order one 
party to execute a waiver to effectuate that allocation. 
The blatant inconsistency that exists between Motes and Fulmer is obvious when the 
following language from each case is compared. In Fulmer. Judge Billings, writing for the 
unanimous panel stated: 
Although many state courts interpreting the predecessor provisions to 
section 152(e) have determined that they have discretion to award the exemption 
in a divorce proceeding, see generally, Davis v. Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711 717 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1986) we agree with the courts that have concluded they do not have 
the authority to grant the exemption contrary to the provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Id. at 718. See also Lorenz v. Lorenz. 166 Mich. App. 58. 419 
N.W. 2d 770 (Mich. App. 1988V. Valento v. Valento. 385 N.W.2d 860 (Minn. 
App. 1986). Id. at 950 (Emphasis on Lorenz citation added.) 
Fulmer followed the rules set out in Lorenz and yet Motes which in no way overruled 
either Martinez or Fulmer cited Lorenz as minority authority which was not persuasive to that 
panel of Court or Appeals Judge Orme, writing for himself and Judges Billings and Greenwood 
stated: 
There is admittedly a split of authority on this question and a minority of 
courts considering the issue have held that the 1984 amendment divests state 
courts of their traditional authority to allocate dependency exemptions and that 
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state courts may not order custodial parents to execute section 152 declarations. 
15 Fam. L. Rp. (BNA) 1335 (May 16, 1989). See McKenzie v. Kinsev. 532 
So.2d 98, 00 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Lorenz v. Lorenz. 166 Mich. App. 58, 
419 N.W.2d 770. 771-72 (1988^: Gleason v. Michlitsch. 82 Or. App. 688, 728 
P.2d 965, 967 (1986); Sarver v. Dathe. 439 N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (S.D. 1989); 
Davis v. Fair. 707 S.W.2d 711, 717-18 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986). Cases following 
the minority view are unpersuasive for at least two reasons. . . . Id, at 238 
(Emphasis added on Lorenz citation added.) 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a Writ of Certiorari 
may be granted for special and important reasons. One of the specific reasons set out in the 
Rules is: 
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict 
with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue of 
law. Id. 
Such an inconsistency is exactly what is now before the Court therefore, Petitioner's 
Writ of Certiorari on this important issue should be granted. 
POINT n 
MRS. MOTES WAS THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY ON APPEAL 
Point II of Major Motes' response is incorrect in stating that he was also a successful 
party in connection with Mrs. Motes' Appeal. To the contrary, Mrs. Motes was required to 
appeal the trial court's award of the major asset of the marriage - Major Motes' military 
retirement. The Court of Appeals agreed with her and reversed stating that the net effect of 
the trial court's approach was: 
. . . to fund defendant's support obligations through what amounts to an 
appropriation of plaintiffs property. Id. at 235. 
Since the major marital asset had to be reallocated, any remand would necessarily 
require a reanalysis of the entire marital estate and related finances and defendant's cross 
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appeal, which was meritless on its face, was not the cause of the remand. (See Order Denying 
Petition for Rehearing — Addendum to Petition for Writ of Certiorari.) 
To argue that he was a successful party on appeal is groundless. Likewise, to argue 
that Mrs. Motes lost on appeal is spurious. 
The Court of Appeals did not follow its own decisions and the decisions of this Court 
in not awarding Mrs. Motes her attorney's fees on appeal when she was the successful party 
on appeal and Point II of Major Motes' Response does not address that failure. 
CONCLUSION 
Major Motes' Response to Mrs. Motes' Petition for Writ of Certiorari is an obfuscation 
and smoke screen which distracts from, rather than focuses on the issues that have been raised 
by Mrs. Motes. 
The Motes opinion is inconsistent with the Martinez and Fulmer opinions and fails to 
follow well established law which awards attorney's fees to a successful party on appeal. 
Mrs. Motes' Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted as prayed. 
Respectfully submitted this / day of May, 1990. 
DART, ADAMSt)N & KASTINf 
Cent M. Kastipg 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/App^llant/v 
Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
Page 
Point I, Mrs. Motes' Petition for Rehearing ~ Utah Court of Appeals ~ 
Denied January 29, 1990 
POINT I 
THIS COURT MISUNDERSTOOD HOW THE TRIAL COURT 
DEALT WITH MRS. MOTES1 INHERITANCE AND ITS 
DICTA RELATIVE TO ITS REMAND SHOULD BE VACATED 
At the time of trial, most of Mrs. Motes1 inheritance had been 
transferred bv the parties to the parties' children in accounts set 
up specifically for the children (Tr. 38, 42 & 69). Mr. Motes 
claimed he was entitled to all of the appreciation on all of the 
inheritance. (Tr. 69 and Defendants Exhibit 1.) 
In arriving at the overall property distribution, the trial 
court isolated and did not include in it either of the parties1 
retirement. Rather, it took the remaining property and awarded 
Mrs. Motes $87,707 in value and Mr. Motes $99,913 in value and then 
explained that the $12,206 difference in favor of Mr. Motes was to 
compensate him for his claim that his efforts increased the value 
of Mrs. Motes1 inheritance (most of which had already been given 
to the children). 
Nowhere in the findings or record is there a suggestion that 
the deferral of the retirement funds distribution was related to 
and based upon the overall property distribution. Therefore, the 
dicta contained in the last paragraph of page 4 of the Motes 
opinion and the further comments contained in footnote 3 reflect 
a misunderstanding of the facts by this Court and give the 
implication that an entire new trial is necessary on all of the 
property issues vis a vis Mr. Motes' entitlement to compensation 
for his alleged "investment services" when it is clear from the 
record that the trial court considered those services. 
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The remedy fashioned by the trial court related to the 
property division was not "inextricably linked" to the trial 
court's deferral of a decision on the distribution of the 
retirement plans. At best, the retirement income deferral issue 
i/as related to the trial court fs award of child support and a 
remand of this case should not, even by inference, suggest an 
entire new trial on all property and support issues. Rather, the 
remand should be for the purposes of determining what child support 
Kr. Motes should have been paying, after considering his actual 
income and his imputed income based upon a full utilization of his 
skills and talents and a determination of what he would then owe 
Mrs. Motes for using all of the retirement income while this appeal 
has been pending. 
The mere passage of substantial amounts of time between the 
trial courtfs distribution of property and this Court's decision 
makes the suggestion that new trial be held on all issues 
impossible, as a practical matter, given changes in financial 
positions of the parties, and fluctuations in asset values which 
have occurred since trial. 
The original property distribution was clearly within the 
discretion of the trial court. Simply because it did not include 
two assets of the marriage (capable of now being separately divided 
very easily) should not be the basis of an entire new trial as now 
has been suggested in the opinion. 
This Court's opinion should be modified with instructions to 
the trial court to divide the pension plans consistent with this 
3 
App« 1988), and to then fix an appropriate award of child support 
based upon the parties1 respective earnings and capacities to earn. 
